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Farm Restructuring and Efficiency in Transition:
Evidence from Bulgaria and Hungary
Erik Mathijs and Liesbet Vranken
ABSTRACT
Based on survey data on Bulgarian and Hungarian crop and dairy farms, a double-peaked
distribution of technical efficiency is observed.  Several factors explain differences in efficiency.
Human capital matters not only through age and education, but also through gender as farms with
a higher share of women are more efficient.  Contracting with upstream processors increase
efficiency through facilitating the adoption of technology and the access to credits. The
superiority of family farms over corporate farms is confirmed for crops but not for dairy.
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Introduction
Farm restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe has been expected to bring about productivity
and efficiency improvements, mainly as a result of improved incentives from competitive
markets.  Reform measures to liberalize prices, abolish subsidies, and create competitive markets
should increase competitive pressures in and push farms to the efficient frontier or drive them out
of business (Sotnikov).  There is a longstanding belief that only production units organized as
family farms will survive, due to their transaction cost advantages in dealing with agency
problems (Schmitt, Deininger).  Studies based on country data suggest that partial and total factor
productivity measures have indeed improved in countries where the shift from collective to
individual tenure has been more profound—such as in Albania and Romania—compared to
countries where large-scale corporate farms persist—such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovakia (Macours and Swinnen, Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998).
Studies using firm-level accountancy data for East Germany and the Czech Republic
suggest that the successors to the large-scale state and collective farms are not necessarily less
efficient than the newly established family farms (Hughes; Mathijs and Swinnen, 2000).
Unfortunately, all these studies have limited explanatory power as efficiency is affected by many
more factors than organizational form, such as human capital and the farm’s environment.  This
paper uses survey data from Bulgaria and Hungary, which provide a rich set of variables to
explain the pattern of technical efficiency.  We proceed in two stages: first, non-parametric firm-4
level technical inefficiency scores will be calculated using Data Envelopment Analysis and
second, these measures will be used as dependent variable in a regression analysis.
Methodology
To measure technical efficiency requires first, the specification of a frontier production function,
and second, the measurement of the deviation or distance of the farms from the frontier, which is
then a measure of technical inefficiency.  For this, we use the technique of Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA), that constructs a convex hull around the observed data (Charnes et al.). A farm
displays total technical efficiency if it produces on the boundary of the production possibility set.
This boundary or frontier is defined as the best practice observed assuming constant returns to
scale (CRS).  Total technical efficiency can be further decomposed into pure technical efficiency
and scale efficiency.  To calculate pure technical efficiency, the production technology is
assumed to display variable returns to scale (VRS).  Scale efficiency is then the residual between
total and pure technical efficiency.  As a result, a farm that displays pure technical efficiency may
not operate at an optimal scale, that is, its input-output combination may not correspond to the
combination that would arise from a zero-profit long-run competitive equilibrium situation (Färe
et al.).
In the remainder of the paper we will only deal with measures of total technical efficiency
to enable the comparison between family farms, most of which are relatively small, with
successor farms of state and collective farms, which are all large.  We follow the approach
suggested by Coelli et al. who contend that  in a VRS model an inefficient farm is benchmarked
against firms of similar size. In a CRS a firm may be benchmarked against firms which are
substantially larger (smaller) than it. As in Färe et al. we assume that production is characterized
by a non-parametric piecewise-linear technology, so that simple linear programming techniques5
can be used to calculate efficiency.  We further assume strong disposability of outputs and inputs
and estimate the non-parametric deterministic frontier, expressed in terms of minimizing input
requirements. Total technical efficiency can be estimated using the following linear program for
each farm k that constructs the CRS frontier: {minl,z l subject to z Y ‡ Yk; z X £ l Xk; z ‡ 0},
where Yk denotes the output of farm k, Xk is a vector of four inputs employed by farm k (capital,
land, labor and other inputs), and z is a vector of k intensities that characterizes each farm.
Data
Data for the efficiency calculation were taken from a representative survey of Hungarian and
Bulgarian farms in 1998.  The survey was stratified according to organizational form (family
farms and corporate farms).  The Hungarian data include 1,618 family farms and 404 corporate
farms (including cooperatives), while the Bulgarian data set contains information on 1,411
households and 196 corporate farms (mostly cooperatives).  A review of the data revealed some
errors and farms for which errors could not be resolved were dropped.  Farms for which
information about physical production was missing were eliminated.  We also removed farms
when  data on either labor, land or capital was missing.  As it is best to study an homogeneous
group of farms, we focus only on farms specialized in crops, a relatively land intensive
commodity, and in dairy, a relatively capital intensive commodity.  To be classified as a crop or a
dairy farm, the value of grain or cow milk production in total output had to be more than 50 %.
As a result of the data cleaning and the omission of mixed farms, we retained 178 Hungarian crop
farms (63 cooperatives, 40 companies, and 75 family farms), 77 Hungarian dairy farms (24
cooperatives, 13 companies, and 40 family farms), and 93 Bulgarian crop farms (45 cooperatives,6
9 companies, and 39 family farms). Bulgarian dairy farms could not be included in the study
since the available number of farms specialized in cow milk production was too small.
The data used for the calculation of technical efficiency include gross output and data on
land, labor, capital and other inputs. Land is total cultivated area multiplied by a land quality
index.  We calculated the input ‘capital’ using the estimated value of farm buildings, machinery,
livestock and plantations.  Labor figures were converted into annual working units (AWU) in
order to achieve comparable data.  In the Hungarian sample, one AWU corresponds to 2,150
labor hours or the number of hours that a full-time worker can perform in one year. The labor
numbers used in the Bulgarian calculations are the total amount of workers and not the total
hours worked.  For intermediate inputs we took into account the value spent on seeds, feed
grains, roughage, concentrated feed, fertilizers, electric energy, gas, fuels and services plus the
value of their inventories.  Output is physical production valued at fixed prices and corrected for
own produced feed used for animals. Using fixed national prices was necessary to avoid that
output would be affected by price differences.  The prices used in the output calculations were
based on price information available in the surveys.
Summary statistics are given in table 1 by organizational form.  Family farms include
both farms registered as sole proprietors and unregistered farms.  Corporate farms are subdivided
into two groups.   First, companies include both privatized state farms registered as joint stock
companies, cooperatives that have turned themselved into joint stock or limited liability
companies and limited partnerships that could have been established as a result of the break-up of
a collective farm or de novo.  Second, cooperatives are true production cooperatives (one man =
one vote).  Table 1 reveals that the family farms in the data set are relatively small compared to
the corporate farms.  A comparison between companies and cooperatives shows that in crop
production the cooperatives are on average larger than the companies, while the opposite is true7
for the dairy farms.  Further, the summary statistics show that the Bulgarian crop farms are on
average smaller than the Hungarian ones.
Efficiency Results
Efficiencies were calculated for each of the three production sectors separately (Hungarian crops,
Bulgarian crops and Hungarian dairy).  The distribution of technical efficiency of Hungarian crop
farms is shown in figure 1.  It shows that the majority of the farms reach an efficiency level
between 30 and 60 %. Both family farms and corporate farms can be found on the frontier, but a
considerably higher share of family farms is located on the frontier. The distribution of
cooperatives is shifted more to the left than those of companies and family farms.  Figure 1
suggests that, while the three production structures can be technically efficient, on average
cooperatives are less efficient than companies, while companies in turn perform worse than
family farms. The average technical efficiencies confirm this idea: family farms reach an average
of 58 %, companies of 50 % and cooperatives of 44 %.  However, the differences are too small to
be conclusive.
A two-peaked distribution of the technical efficiency of Bulgarian crop farms becomes
clear in figure 2.  Corporate and family farms are able to become technically efficient.  In
comparison with Hungarian crop farms, we find a relative large amount of inefficient production
units.  For example, more than 30 % of the cooperatives reach an efficiency level lower then 20
%, while none of the Hungarian cooperatives specialized in crop production performed that bad
in terms of efficiency.  Companies reach an average efficiency of 51 % and thus perform better
than family farms that reach an average efficiency of 44 %. It is important to take into account
that the data contains only 9 Bulgarian companies specialized in crop production.  This should be8
kept in mind when a comparison is made between companies and one of the other two production
structures. The average efficiency of cooperatives is 43 %.
Figure 3 displays the distribution of the technical efficiency of the Hungarian dairy farms.
A two-peaked distribution is shown: 45 % of the dairy farms reach an efficiency level between 10
% and 20 % and a rather large amount of the farms is located on the frontier—both family and
corporate farms. The distribution of cooperatives is again shifted to the left. This is translated into
a rather low average efficiency of 39 %. Companies perform somewhat better: they reach an
average of 43 % due to the large amount of companies located on the frontier. The large spread of
family farms leads to an average efficiency of 45 %, which does not allow us to conclude that
they are more technically efficient than companies or cooperatives.
To conclude, huge inefficiencies are apparent in all three sectors.  Organizational form
seems to be playing in role in explaining some in the differences in inefficiency, but it is also
clear that additional factors will play an important role.  In the next section, we will explore the
factors that determine technical (in)efficiency in more detail.
Regression results
To assess the sources of measured efficiencies, we use a Tobit regression model as efficiency
scores are truncated (Zheng et al.).  Farm-specific estimates of total technical efficiency are used
as dependent variable.  As information on potential explanatory variables differs by
organizational form, we carried out three sets of regressions: the first set including only family
farms, the second only corporate farms and the third pools data on family farms and corporate
farms.  In each case we use variables reflecting the stock of farm resources, such as human and
physical capital, the flow of farm resources (investment) and farm organization.9
Family farms
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the explanatory variables used in the regressions using
data only for family farms:
As proxies for the stock of resources, we use the average age of farm operators who spent
most of their time on the farm (age), the average number of years of schooling of the most active
farm operators (education), and the average share of women in adult household members
(gender).  On average, Bulgarian farmers (60 years) are older than Hungarian ones (51 years),
while the level of education is about the same (9 to 11 years of schooling).  We also introduce the
variable purchased land, which is the share of newly purchased land in the total land holding of
the household.  This variable may be interpreted as reflecting the entrepreneurial ability of a
household.
The resource flow is captured first of all by the dummy variable investment that equals
one if the household has made any investment in the last year.  Hungarian farmers have invested
slightly more (58 to 65 %) than Bulgarian ones (44 %).  Further, the dummy variable contract,
that equals one when some sales where made on contract, is introduced to test whether
contracting has facilitated the access to technology.  While quite a high share of Hungarian
farmers deliver their produce on contract (31 to 45 %), contracting is relatively unimportant for
Bulgarian family farms (13 %).  For Bulgarian crop farmers, we introduced an additional variable
sales, which is a dummy that equals 0 if all production is consumed within the household and 1 if
at least some products are sold.  Table 2 reveals that 15 % of all Bulgarian crop farmers sold
nothing at all.
Farm organization is captured by the following variables: specialization is the share of
grains or milk in total output; feed production is a dummy that equals one if feed used for the
breeding of animals was partly produced on the farm; and member/partner is a dummy that10
equals one when at least one household member is member of a cooperative or partner in a
company.  The summary statistics reveal that 75 % of all dairy farms produce their own feed.
Further, only a small share of family farms has a direct link with a cooperative or company.
The results of the regressions are shown in table 3.  We also introduced the land-man ratio
to account for the differences in natural environment and in the case of Hungarian crop farmers
also the distance to the nearest bus stop.  The following conclusions can be reached:
First, the results confirm the importance of human capital: the positive impact of
education on technical efficiency is strongly confirmed both in dairy and crop production and in
Bulgaria and Hungary.  The effect of age differs.  While age has a positive impact on Hungarian
crop farms, it has a negative effect on Hungarian dairy and Bulgarian crop farms.  The share of
women in the household always has a positive impact on efficiency, but only significantly so in
the case of Hungarian crop farms.  The variable land acquisition has a positive and significant
effect on the efficiency of Hungarian farms and is probably a proxy for the entrepreneurial
orientation of the household. Economic size as measured by total output has a positive effect on
efficiency in Hungary—not in Bulgaria—which suggests that larger family farms are more
efficient than smaller ones.  This is consistent with the general wisdom that the average cost
curve in agriculture is L-shaped (Hallam).
Second, contracting has a positive and significant effect on technical efficiency, but more
so in Hungarian crop farming than in Hungarian dairy farming.  This result supports Gow and
Swinnen who report the positive effects of contracts offered to farmers by upstream processors,
as the latter often provide advice, information and new technology, but also because such
contracts facilitate the farmer’s access to credits through the intermediation efforts of the
processor.  For the regression on Bulgarian crop farms we also introduced a variable sales to
capture the effects of subsistence.  This was not necessary in Hungary where all farms are11
commercial businesses. Sales have a positive effect on efficiency, which suggest that subsistence
has a negative impact on technical efficiency.  This confirms the finding of Parikh et al. that
subsistence prevents farmers from reaching the efficiency frontier.  When, in addition, products
are being sold on contract, efficiency increases even more.  Further, the negative effect of the
investment dummy for Hungarian farms seems strange, as investment is mostly increasing
efficiency though improved technology.  However, crop farms invested in livestock rather than in
assets enhancing crop productivity.  Moreover, as the specialization variable shows, specialized
farms are more efficient, which suggests that economies of specialization outweigh economies of
scope.
Third, membership in another agricultural enterprise has a negative effect for Hungarian
crop farms, but a positive impact for Hungarian dairy farms and Bulgarian crop farms.  Several
factors play a role here.  The traditional explanation is that off-farm work has a negative effect on
efficiency, as less time is spent on managerial activities improving farm efficiency (Timmer,
Parikh et al.).  However, Herdt and Mandac found a positive relationship, which suggests that
spending time off farm improves the farmer’s managerial skills through the acquisition of
information.  However, enterprise membership also reflects a better access to services, such as
input provision, marketing and machinery.  Sedik et al. stressed the importance of the presence of
reliable channels of supply and sales to reduce the amount of resources devoted to search and to
deal with the uncertainty associated with transition.  Particularly the latter plays an important role
in Bulgaria.
Corporate farms
The summary statistics of explanatory variables for cooperatives and companies are given in
table 4.  With respect to human resources, only gender and the share of workers older than 6012
could be used (60+).  Again, Bulgarian farmers are older than Hungarian farmers, while slightly
more women are employed on Bulgarian farms. Contract and investment have the same meaning
as for the family farms.  Almost all Hungarian farms sell their produce on contract (100 % for
dairy and 92-95 % for crops), while only a quarter to a third of the Bulgarian corporate farms sell
on contract.  While specialization and feed production have the same meaning as for family
farms, several additional variables related to the property rights and governance structure of
corporate farms are included:
• Insider: the share of insiders, i.e. people actually working on the farm, in the total number
of members.  Particularly Hungarian dairy companies are characterized by a high share of
absentee landowners (79 % of all members are absentee).  Cooperatives have generally
less outsiders.
• Joint venture: enterprises with shares in other enterprises or from which shares are owned
by other enterprises.  The numbers point to a relatively high integration of both Hungarian
companies and cooperatives into down- or upstream firms.  This is due to the privatisation
process which allowed corporate farms to buy shares of food processors.  A similar
process did not happen in Bulgaria, where cooperatives are far less integrated.
• Transfer: dummy variable equal to 1 when a member or partner is allowed to transfer his
or her ownership rights to his or her children.  Interestingly, up to 46 % of Hungarian
dairy cooperatives report that property rights are restricted, a surprisingly high figure
considering property rights should be strong.
• Sell: dummy variable equal to 1 when a member of partner is allowed to sell his or her
land.13
• De novo: dummy variable equal to 1 when the farm has not been established as a direct
successor of a state or collective farm.  Most cooperatives are successors, while half to
two thirds of the companies were established de novo
• Non-agricultural activities: dummy variable equal to 1 when the farm has non-
agricultural activities.  Particularly Hungarian cooperatives are characterized by having
activities in addition to their farming operation.
The results of the three regression analyses are summarized in table 5 and allow to draw
the following conclusions:
First, human capital has limited explanatory power to account for differences in technical
efficiency among corporate farms.  Both the share of labor force older than 60 years and the share
of women in the labor force only have a positive impact on the efficiency of Hungarian dairy
farms.  Further, as for the family farms, economic size has also a positive impact on the
efficiency of all corporate farms.  This is a bit surprising, but the effect is smaller as reflected by
the smaller size of the coefficients.
Second, contract production has a positive impact on the performance of Hungarian crop
farms. We introduced an interaction term between investment and contract in the regression on
Bulgarian crop farms. The positive impact of contract production is even more stressed: farms
that invested in 1997 and did not have contract production are less efficient than farms that
invested and did sell products on contract.
Third, the share of insiders has a positive influence on the technical efficiency of
cooperatives. This can be ascribed to the fact that a high share of active members facilitates
supervision. The effect of the share of insiders on the efficiency level of companies, as captured
by the interaction effect company*insider, is negative which supports the idea that outside
ownership increases the access to capital and encourages managers to improve technical14
efficiency.  Companies perform significantly better than cooperatives, which suggests that
principal-agent problems are more restrictive in the latter.  Among Hungarian dairy farms, de
novo farms are more efficient than direct successors of cooperatives or state farms.
Fourth, property rights matter as the variable transfer has a negative impact on technical
efficiency of Hungarian crop farms. If members or partners of a corporate farm are able to pass
on ownership rights directly to their children, the corporate farm herself is land insecure.  Of
course, this will have a negative effect on its efficiency. Nevertheless, this variable has an
opposite effect on the efficiency level of Bulgarian crop farms. But here we introduced a dummy
variable sell, which equals one if members or partners of a corporate farm could withdraw and
sell their land. This variable also has a negative impact on the efficiency level. The variable sell
was even more significant than the variable transfer. So, we can conclude that land insecurity has
also a negative effect on the efficiency of Bulgarian crop farms.
Fifth, only the efficiency level of Bulgarian crop farms is significantly affected by the
degree of specialization, as more specialized farms are more efficient.  Farms that are engaged in
non-agricultural activities do not perform wel.  This confirms the idea regarding the efficiency
advantages of specialized firms.  In the crop sector, joint ventures are performing significantly
better than other firms.  This can be ascribed to the exchange of technological and managerial
know-how.
All farms
Regression results for all farms pooled together are summarized in table 6.  Only a limited
number of variables could be included (gender, age, output, specialization, feed production,
contract, investment).  The results seem to support the hypothesis put forward by Allen and
Lueck: in crop production, an extensive production sector, family farms are significantly more15
efficient than corporate farms, while in an intensive production sector as dairy, there are no
significant differences between family farms and corporate farms.
Conclusions
In this paper we used survey data on Bulgarian and Hungarian crop and dairy farms to meausure
and explain farm-specific technical efficiency.  Using Data Envelopment Analysis, a double-
peaked distribution of efficiency can be observed, suggesting that most farms are far from the
efficiency frontier.  Hypotheses testing through Tobit regressions confirmed the superiority of
family farms over corporate farms in crop farming, but rejected it in dairy farming.  This result
confirms the theory that family farms can only be more efficient in orientations where the
influence of nature still plays a dominant role.  An important policy implication is that farm
restructuring towards individual tenures is only increasing efficiency in crop farming.  The
analysis further indicated that not only age and education play an important role, but also gender.
Farms with a higher share of women are more efficient.  This suggests that policies should be
directed at women not only for equity reasons, giving women equal access to wealth, but also for
efficiency reasons.  Finally, a strong positive effect of contracts with upstream processors was
found both for family and corproate farms.  Contracts facilitate the adoption of technology and
the access to credits.  Governments should create an attractive environment for contracting and
foreign direct investment, particularly as such contracts are introduced by foreign firms.  Vertical
coordination is an important strategy to tackle the situation of imperfect and missing markets that
is so characteristic for transition economies.16
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Figure 3b. Distribution of total technical efficiency of Hungarian dairy farms by legal form.21
Table 1. Summary statistics
Family farm Corporate farm
Company Cooperative
Average St.Dev Average St.Dev Average St.Dev
HUNGARY
Crop farms
 Output (· 10
6 HUF) 1.605 3.683 86.876 78.345 106.583 82.068
 Land (ha) 26 60 1282 974 1645 1085
 Labor (AWU) 1.2 1 26 23 58 41
 Capital (· 10³ HUF) 2600 5031 48760 47901 93841 83383
 Inputs (· 10³ HUF) 971 2142 57490 56890 69506 68305
Dairy farms
Output (· 10
6 HUF) 0.860 1.353 756.510 1558.941 606.860 604.907
Land (ha) 3 4 2339 2031 2131 1512
Labor (AWU) 1.6 1.1 137 134 137 103
Capital (· 10³ HUF) 985 807 340370 392341 240367 147629




6 BUL) 4.871 7.746 324.955 474.846 415.215 424.815
Land (ha) 6 11 453 477 838 793
Labor (AWU) 1.2 0.8 11 10 44 39
Capital (· 10³ BUL) 17996 27619 59343 75384 432768 1880651
Inputs (· 10³ BUL) 651 1541 19887 19296 53990 76920
Source: Own calculations22
Table 2. Summary statistics of explanatory variables, family farms
Hungary, crops Hungary, dairy Bulgaria, crops
Age 51 years 51 years 60 years
Education 11 years 9 years 10 years
Gender 29 % 36 % 40 %
Land acquisition 13 % 14 % na
Contract* 31 % 45 % 13 %
Sales* na na 85 %
Investment* 65 % 58 % 44 %
Specialization 77 % 73 % 78 %
Feed production* na 75 % na
Member/partner* 19 % 25 % 15 %
Landman-ratio 22 ha/AWU 2 ha/AWU 10 ha/AWU
Distance 0.79 km na na
* Share of family farms for which the dummy variable equals one.
Source: Own calculations23
Table 3. Tobit regression results for family farms
Hungary, crops Hungary, dairy Bulgaria, crops Independent
variables coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. Prob.
Stock
  Age 3.66 0.0001 -1.99 0.0443 -2.78 0.4793
  Age^2 -0.03 0.0019 0.03 0.0022 0.02 0.5810
  Education 5.67 0.0134 21.04 0.0069 12.82 0.0048
  Education^2 -0.31 0.0006 -0.98 0.0228 -0.64 0.0037
  Gender 0.43 0.0001 0.14 0.1738 0.06 0.6996
  Land acquisition 0.29 0.0015 0.36 0.0001 - -
  Output 0.50 0.0090 0.08 0.0327 0.36 0.5362
Flow
  Contract 24.99 0.0001 11.86 0.0169 25.29 0.0821
  Sales - - - - 22.22 0.0397
  Invest -8.84 0.1149 -13.97 0.0269 7.23 0.4401
Organization
  Specialization 0.13 0.3685 0.68 0.0033 1.16 0.0003
  Feed production - - 0.43 0.9496 - -
  Member/partner -13.42 0.0270 17.04 0.0011 15.07 0.2257
Landman-ratio -0.27 0.0004 -3.44 0.0184 - -
Distance 14.93 0.0001 - - - -
Intercept -94.57 0.0018 -97.83 0.0691 -27.01 0.7765
Source: Own calculations24








60 + 1 % 1 % 14 %
Gender 13 % 22 % 30 %
Contract* 95 % 100 % 33 %
Investment* 60 % 77 % 78 %
Insider 53 % 21 % 80 %
Joint venture* 45 % 62 % 33 %
Transfer of ownership rights to children* 80 % 85 % 67 %
Sell* na na 78 %
De novo* 68  % 46 % na
Specialization 78 % 72 % 93 %
Feed production* na 85 % na
Non-agricultural activities * 30 % 46 % 33 %




Hungary, dairy Bulgaria, crops
60 + 2 % 1 % 19 %
Gender 28 % 25 % 28 %
Contract* 92 % 100 % 25 %
Investment* 65 % 71 % 71 %
Insider 67 % 75 % 70 %
Joint venture* 64 % 63 % 22 %
Transfer of ownership rights to children* 73 % 54 % 71 %
Sell* na na 36 %
De novo* 6 % 17 % na
Specialization 74 % 69 % 82 %
Feed production* na 96 % na
Non-agricultural activities * 70 % 54 % 16 %
Landman-ratio 45 ha/AWU 18 ha/AWU 23 ha/AWU
* Share of companies for which the dummy variable equals one.
Source: Own calculations25
Table 5. Tobit Regression results for corporate farms
Hungary, crops Hungary, dairy Bulgaria, crops
coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob.
Stock
  60+ -1.14 0.1758 5.58 0.0008 0.26 0.2376
  Gender 0.03 0.8294 1.74 0.0001 -0.26 0.1882
  Output 0.08 0.0080 0.06 0.0001 0.03 0.0443
Flow
  Contract 11.39 0.0892 - - -18.10 0.2300
  Invest 11.09 0.0071 -6.68 0.1561 -50.08 0.0002
  Invest*contract - - - - 56.49 0.0010
Organisation
  Insider 0.15 0.0076 0.15 0.0871 0.21 0.0298
  Company 27.63 0.0001 38.28 0.0001 73.79 0.0201
  Company*insider -0.26 0.0044 -0.51 0.0001 -0.40 0.2703
  Venture 8.22 0.0489 -0.70 0.8657 27.61 0.0087
  Transfer -16.55 0.0007 6.85 0.1631 21.98 0.0094
  Sell - - - - -40.64 0.00
  De novo - - 28.72 0.0055 - -
  Specialization -0.11 0.4288 -0.12 0.7255 1.25 0.0001
  Feed production - - 72.85 0.0001 - -
  Non-agr.activities -14.89 0.0002 -24.94 0.0001 -1.51 0.8654
Landman-ratio -0.06 0.0425 0.16 0.5390 -0.08 0.0036
Intercept 41.89 0.0026 -103.36 0.0001 -38.25 0.2376
Source: Own calculations26
Table 6. Tobit Regression results for all farms
Hungary, crops Hungary, dairy Bulgaria, crops Independent
variables Coefficient prob. coefficient prob. coefficient prob.
Stock
  Gender 0.26 0.0017 0.05 0.7330 0.14 0.3420
  60+ -0.04 0.5808 0.18 0.0368 -0.14 0.1504
  Output 0.07 0.0463 0.04 0.0001 0.02 0.0432
Flow
  Contract - - - - 22.90 0.0068
  Invest 9.14 0.0773 -14.48 0.1388 - -
  Invest * family
  farm
-27.10 0.0010 8.56 0.4926 - -
Organization
  Company 16.99 0.0004 18.24 0.0595 -3.79 0.7477
  Family farm 49.21 0.0001 16.33 0.1945 28.80 0.0014
  Specialization -0.28 0.0168 1.50 0.0001 1.34 0.0001
  Feed production - - 10.13 0.2249 - -
Intercept 51.08 0.0001 -79.83 0.0003 -74.56 0.0017
Source: Own calculations